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
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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UAE-US

Relations Good but Dependent on the Israel Factor

The US embassy in Abu Dhabi, in a recent assessment, pronounced the state of relations between the US and the United Arab Emirates "basically good" and saw encouraging prospects for further development along positive lines. The embassy noted, however, that bilateral relations will continue to be affected by the acute sensitivity of the leaders of the UAE to the ups and downs of the Arab-Israeli situation and the US role in that sphere.

Key figures in the government of the United Arab Emirates see the US as inheritor of the mantle formerly worn by the United Kingdom as overseer of a world order in which small states such as the UAE can prosper in relative security. Sheikh Zayid, president of the federation and ruler of Abu Dhabi, and other members of the ruling elite want access to US science and technology and they value US support for the three-year-old federation.

The US' ability to capitalize on this basically favorable political environment depends to a large extent upon US diplomatic efforts in the Arab-Israeli dispute. At present, Sheikh Zayid is reportedly more appreciative of the US role in trying to arrange a satisfactory settlement than he was during the October War when Abu Dhabi took the lead among the Arabs in embargoing oil shipments to the US. While Zayid is continually subjected to the advice of Iraqis and hard-line Palestinians who would like to see US efforts fail, he is aware that renewed warfare would disrupt the UAE's ties with the West and create new opportunities for the extension of radical Arab and Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. Zayid, therefore, is anxious for US efforts to succeed and he will support any settlement acceptable to Syria and Egypt.

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Oil policy is another, albeit less divisive, area of friction in UAE-US relations. The reluctance of the Europeans to bargain hard for lower oil prices has placed the efforts made by the US in sharp focus. UAE officials, however, are becoming increasingly concerned about the difficulties they face in selling their oil and are beginning to realize that their decisions on oil cannot be taken in isolation from world economic conditions.

Since the Sinai and Golan disengagement agreements last year--and in spite of differences over oil policy--ties between the US and the UAE have grown noticeably. US firms have recently been awarded some major contracts in the development sector and the US community has expanded to an estimated 1,500-2,000. Provided there is additional movement in Arab-Israeli negotiations, this trend can be expected to continue. Even in these most favorable circumstances, however, UAE leaders will be careful to balance the US role in their country with that of other friendly industrial powers notably France, the UK, and Japan. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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Angola*Planning the Unified Military Force*

The transitional government, which includes representatives of Portugal and the territory's three recognized liberation groups, has worked out a preliminary agreement governing the establishment of a national army. The independence accord signed by the four parties in Portugal last month provided for a 48,000-man force with Portugal contributing half the personnel and the rest contributed equally by the three African organizations. Lisbon will withdraw the remainder of the approximately 40,000 troops it now has in Angola by the end of April and will withdraw its contribution to the national army within three months after independence in November.

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[REDACTED] the territory will be divided into six military zones. In each zone the unified military force will be composed of an equal number of troops from the three liberation groups and a contingent of Portuguese troops that will equal the total provided by the liberation movements. The zones probably will be commanded by a Portuguese officer. Each nationalist contingent and the Portuguese will be billeted separately and personnel will be integrated only during operations.

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Lisbon will pay the cost of the Portuguese troops and the transitional government will fund the contingents from the liberation groups. Nationalist troops are to be fully trained by their respective organizations before being deployed. Officer candidates from the liberation groups will be trained in Portugal.

These arrangements are probably the maximum possible in view of the delicate balance of power that exists between the three competing former insurgent groups. They are unlikely to produce a truly integrated national army in the near future, since each liberation group wants to retain control of its own military force. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Pakistan

More Violence Anticipated in the North-West Frontier

Anti-government elements in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province may increasingly resort to violence as a result of the government's crackdown on the opposition National Awami Party (NAP), the largest party in the province. The US consul in Peshawar, the provincial capital, reports that most people there are expecting a rise in violence and bloodshed.

Since the murder on February 8 of Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, Prime Minister Bhutto's chief political lieutenant in the province, the government has outlawed the NAP and arrested over 500 of its supporters and leaders, including party chief Wali Khan. Hundreds of other NAP supporters reportedly have fled to nearby rural tribal areas and to neighboring Afghanistan, where the government has long provided some support to the NAP.

There have already been a number of disturbances in the province since the Sherpao murder. These have been largely the work of government supporters, who have been conducting demonstrations against the NAP and have damaged offices and other buildings belonging to the party and its leaders. An increase in violence directed against the government may lie ahead; the crackdown on the NAP may stimulate violent activity by young radicals. These people are said to be affiliated with the NAP and to share its desire for provincial self-determination. But they are, more radical than the party leadership--particularly with regard to the use of violence--and they apparently are not under the leaders' control. These young militants may well have been behind a series of bombings in the frontier province in recent months. While such activities may increase, we believe the government, which can count on the support of the army, is strong enough to prevent a collapse of its authority in the province.

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Islamabad has still not specifically charged anyone with Sherpao's murder. Various observers have suggested that the perpetrators could have been either NAP-affiliated young radicals or other political or personal enemies of Sherpao. The government also has not yet directly charged Afghanistan with complicity in the murder. Public statements by officials have inferred Afghan responsibility, however. Government-controlled media have been suggesting that elements in Pakistan affiliated with Ajmal Khattak, a militant former NAP leader now exiled in Kabul, were behind the Sherpao incident.

Kabul's response to these allegations has been relatively restrained so far; the Afghans may still be waiting to see how far Bhutto will go in alleging Afghan responsibility. One apparent casualty of the Sherpao killing has been a nascent dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan on bilateral problems.



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